Woodford (2007) argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of New Keynesian models as determined by steady-state money growth. Woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority's interest-rate policy rule determines steady-state inflation. In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation of steady-state behavior, according to which it is appropriate to regard steady-state inflation as determined by steady-state money growth. The argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank's power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and New Keynesian analysis. According to this argument, the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation, and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate. JEL Classification Numbers: E43; E51; E52.
Introduction
Several economists familiar with New Keynesian models have argued that these models imply that money growth determines inflation in the long run. For example , Ireland (2004, p. 979) concluded an analysis of an estimated New Keynesian model by observing that "the monetary authority must choose the steady-state rate of inflation, which is ultimately determined by the rate of nominal money growth…" Woodford (2007) , however, argues that economists who believe that money growth determines inflation in the long run in New Keynesian models do so because of their own "misunderstanding" of how these models work. In this paper I provide a rebuttal to this argument and make the case that, in New Keynesian models, money growth indeed determines inflation in the long run. I do not want this discussion to overshadow substantial areas of agreement with Woodford (2007) , so I state those areas of agreement first and explore their implications for work on monetary policy. The areas of agreement are covered in Section 2, and the long-run money growth/inflation relationship is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 considers possible objections, and Section 5 provides brief concluding remarks.
Areas of agreement
Three major areas of agreement with Woodford are on (1) emphasizing the contribution of monetarism to present-day monetary analysis; (2) the false leads provided by some advocates of monetary aggregates; and (3) distinguishing money and credit. What follows is not a simple catalogue of agreement. Instead, my intention is to bring out some points not covered by Woodford: connections of monetarism to New Keynesian economics beyond those he listed; common elements in Woodford's (2007) views on money and credit, and those in the monetarist literature; and how the criticism of New Keynesian models made by Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) , though motivated by appealing to the quantity theory of money, actually finds no support in the work of Milton Friedman.
Contributions of monetarism
While the topic of Woodford's paper is "How Important Is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?," his Section 1 deals with "The Historical Significance of Monetarism." It is very appropriate that a discussion of money's present status should begin with a discussion of monetarism. It is as natural and essential to consider monetarism in a discussion of today's role for money as it is to consider the Great Inflation in a discussion of the Great Moderation. Many of the policymaking principles put into practice in major countries today are inherited from ideas articulated by monetarists during earlier periods. Moreover, the durability of monetarist ideas is also manifested in research that improves upon and extends New Keynesian models. The study by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) is a leading example of the productive interaction of the monetarist literature and state-of-the-art modeling. Their work proposes several modifications to a New Keynesian baseline model, with the added model elements inspired by the desire to test hypotheses advanced in the monetarist literature. The result is a much more rigorous foundation for the frictions mentioned in monetarist work than achieved in the existing New Keynesian, or any preceding, literature. Another example of a productive synthesis of the monetarist literature and modern macroeconomic modeling is that in Dotsey and King (2005, pp. 214, 227) , who connect the properties of their state-dependent pricing model to the list of empirical propositions about the effects of monetary policy given in Friedman (1987) .
Clarifying the enduring contribution of monetarism is especially important because many prior discussions provide quite a misleading picture. I find the contributions of Alan Blinder and Willem Buiter to be particularly interesting in illustrating the problems of correctly disentangling the legacy of monetarism. These authors hold special positions in that they both contributed prominent papers on the Keynesian side during the years of Keynesian-monetarist debate (see Blinder and Solow, 1973; Tobin and Buiter, 1976 ).
Moreover, they both later served as monetary policy makers (on the Federal Open Market
Committee in Blinder's case; on the United Kingdom's Monetary Policy Committee in Buiter's case) in an era where policymaking and monetary policy thinking had more or less reached their modern-day configuration. Given this background, it might seem that these authors are in an ideal position to judge how monetarism has contributed to modern policymaking and to present-day views of monetary policy. But I find, on the contrary, that these two authors' writings, in contrast to Woodford (2007) , give an unhelpful account of the enduring contributions of monetarism. Both Blinder and Buiter could have done much more by way of acknowledging the extent to which monetarist propositions have become standard.
The problem with Blinder's accounts is that while he emphasizes the durability of Keynesian economics (see, for example, Blinder, 1984 Blinder, , 1987 , he fails to acknowledge the influence monetarism has had even on the development of his own views. The fact is that, at the same time that big movements in velocity got all the publicity in the 1980s, and so produced many "monetarism is dead" judgments, key aspects of the monetaristKeynesian debate were being tacitly settled on the monetarists' terms. This capitulation on Keynesians' part is as evident in Blinder's work as much as anyone's. For example, Baumol and Blinder (1979, p. 288) , taking a Keynesian perspective, argued that "demand fluctuations are not the only cause of inflation, and, in particular, they have played a rather minor role in the inflation we have been experiencing since 1973." Moreover, to the extent that Baumol and Blinder acknowledged a role for demand in determining inflation, they saw it as working via a permanent-trade-off Phillips curve, not a Phillips curve embedding long-run natural-rate properties: "the inference that therefore the tradeoff no longer exists was, and still is, unwarranted " (1979, p. 287) . In Baumol and Blinder (1982, pp. 301−303) , however, this discussion was dropped in favor of an exposition of the temporary nature of the trade-off and of the tendency for the economic system to return to the natural rate of unemployment. Another example of monetarists' influence on Blinder (and on the profession) deals with the issue of lags in effect of monetary policy. Blinder (1984) rejected the Friedman dictum that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" and suggested that it was contradicted by the fact that inflation in specified periods did not move in the same direction as same-period money growth. Blinder (1997) , by contrast, argues that the lag in the effect of monetary policy is a very important consideration that must be taken into account.
Whereas Blinder tends to describe as "Keynesian" the set of views that he has converged to in the wake of the Keynesian-monetarist debate, Buiter (2003) tends to attribute to James Tobin the aspects of the modern monetary policy framework that Buiter likes.
Moreover, Buiter casts monetarism in negative terms, building Tobin up by attributing to monetarists views they did not hold and giving Tobin credit he happens not to deserve.
So Buiter attributes to Milton Friedman the view that money demand is interest inelastic, a view to which Friedman clearly did not subscribe, 1 while Buiter claims that the modern monetary policy framework is in keeping with Tobin's views, which it clearly is not. In fact, Tobin was a longtime advocate of nonmonetary approaches to the analysis and control of inflation (see Nelson and Schwartz, 2008, pp. 841−842) , and such nonmonetary approaches are anathema to the modern way of thinking about monetary policy.
- Friedman (1972 
False leads from advocates of money
Woodford writes that the statements about modern models made by Alvarez, Lucas, and
Brunner and Meltzer often emphasized this channel (see, for example, Brunner and Meltzer, 1976) . See also Friedman (1972, pp. 944−945) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp. 56−57) for related discussions. 3 For a recent generalization of New Keynesian models that goes in this direction, see Canzoneri et al (2008) .
Weber (2001) the older monetarists, after decades' study of the behavior of money and velocity and of the lag from money growth to inflation, never discovered this regularity and noted it. In fact, monetarists did note this regularity on many occasions. 5 New Keynesians can legitimately doubt that work on money like Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) materially adds to the profession's stock of knowledge.
Of course, one of the authors of Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) , Robert Lucas, is steeped in the monetarist tradition. But monetarist authors are not cited in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) ; and the key misstatements in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber would not be supported by the core monetarists. For example, Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001, p. 219) assert that the position that "inflation can be reduced by increasing short-term interest rates" is "a rejection of the quantity theory." By contrast, Milton Friedman once said, "if you really want to lower interest rates, the way to do it is by starting out to raise them" (quoted in Crawford, 1970 are deposits. Moving to the asset side, earning assets of banks can be treated synonymously with "bank credit" only if one defines credit as including loans to the public sector (e.g., banks' investments in Treasury securities). And no matter how wide the definition of bank credit, there are many channels of credit (to both the private and public sectors) outside the deposit-taking banking system.
For broad measures of money and for measures of credit restricted to cover earning assets of those institutions whose deposit liabilities are included in the monetary aggregate, the relationship between money and credit will be closest. But even then, the identities that connect the two series are not such as to make one confident that the two variables will move together. The reason is that money and credit are not the only nonnegligible terms in these identities; there are invariably extra variables that can and do produce
discrepancies between money and credit. The position that money and credit move rigidly together therefore rests on an illegitimate ceteris paribus assumption regarding the additional endogenous terms that appear in the relevant identities.
Moreover, banks' historical involvement in lending activities not listed on their balance sheets reinforces the presumption that money and credit creation will have a loose relationship. In the United States, regulations on banking activity led in the past to now well-publicized efforts on the part of commercial banks to participate in the spread of what Bernanke (2008) describes as "credit products and special-purpose investment vehicles" that were "circumventing the need for traditional bank financing." Though not categorized as balance-sheet items by banks, these vehicles sometimes did, as Bernanke notes, entail bank involvement in an advisory or underwriting capacity. 7 The channeling of banking business into off-balance-sheet activity was a prominent instance of credit expansion becoming further disconnected from deposit expansion. favorable results regarding money using data for both economies. Third, commercial banks in the United Kingdom over the 1950s and 1960s and into the early 1970s generally refrained both from mortgage lending and from lending for corporate investment in physical capital; but broad monetary aggregates tended to have better relations with major macroeconomic variables in those years than they did subsequently, when the scope of bank lending broadened considerably.
Money growth and inflation in the long run
Many specialists on monetary policy issues view inflation in the long run as pinned down by money growth in the long run. Woodford notes that I argued along those lines myself in Nelson (2003) and that I claimed that the steady-state properties of New Keynesian models supported such a view. Woodford (2007, p. 13) states, "But this is a misunderstanding." In this section, I make the case that such a view does not reflect a misunderstanding, but instead an attempt to take into account basic properties about the effect of monetary policy in the long run. I first present a version of Woodford's critique that is convenient for later discussion (Section 3.1). Then I discuss the properties of the economy in the steady state (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), and on that basis defend the proposition that money growth does actually determine inflation in the long run (Section 3.4).
Determination of steady-state inflation
Woodford's approach can be thought of as one of counting equations and unknowns in a New Keynesian model. Woodford notes that a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is (his equation (2.1), p. 6):
where π t is quarterly inflation, Y t is the level of output, Y t n is the natural level of output, u t is a zero-mean Phillips curve shock, κ > 0, and 0 < β < 1; and π t * is the steady-state inflation rate.
The time subscript in π t * allows the steady-state rate of inflation to vary across periods; it appears in the Phillips curve due to assumed continuous indexation of nominal price contracts to steady-state inflation. As Woodford notes, the time-variation in the steadystate inflation rate reflects fluctuations in the central bank's inflation target. Allowing the inflation target to vary over time makes the policy rule more general; 8 in particular, the
More general, that is, in the sense that shifts in the steady-state inflation rate have occurred historically so that a policy rule that recognizes this could be more realistic as a description of historical experience.
Other aspects of the realism of this specification may be questioned, however. In particular, the monetary authorities of the United States and other countries in the 1970s denied that inflation was a monetary phenomenon; so while whatever monetary policy actions they took inevitably implied a certain steady-generalization accommodates nonstationary behavior of inflation. 
where σ > 0, r t n is the short-term natural real rate of interest, and R t is the short-term nominal interest rate.
Policy rule (assumed to be a Taylor-type rule, incorporating a response to the modelconsistent output gap):
where R t * is a time-varying intercept term, and φ π > 1, φ y ≥ 0.
10

Money demand equation:
state inflation rate, it attributes too much knowledge on the part of policymakers to label the resulting series their "target. (2001), who assumed a constant inflation target. 10 The assumption that φ π > 1 follows McCallum's (2001) exposition of the New Keynesian model. It is a special case of the analysis in Woodford (2007) , where equilibrium is obtained under the assumption that a weighted combination of φ π and φ y is sufficiently large. This more general formulation reflects the recognition that under sticky prices, responses to the output gap can substitute for responses to inflation.
where (m t -p t ) is log real balances, c 1 > 0, c 2 < 0, and η t is a zero-mean money demand shock. While Woodford's (2007) framework can accommodate economic growth, I assume here that output does not have a trend.
As this loglinear system has explicit constant (or time-varying intercept) terms, long-run solutions for variables can be derived from the equations. Woodford argues that the last equation (the money demand equation) is not required to study the determination of steady-state inflation. To see his argument, one first needs to decompose the intercept of the monetary policy rule. Woodford (2007, p. 8) defines the intercept as the central bank's "estimate of where the intercept needs to be in order for this policy rule to be consistent with the inflation target"; if the central bank's estimate of the steady-state natural rate is accurate, the long-run value of this intercept is E[R t *] = E[r t n ] + π* where π* is the constant inflation target. Then equations (1)−(3) in steady state imply:
These conditions indicate that steady-state inflation is equal to the policy-determined inflation target; that output is equal to its natural level; and that the steady-state policy rule devolves into a steady-state Fisher condition, with inflation equal to the inflation target. So there are three unknowns-i.e., the expectations of the endogenous variables π t , log Y t , and R t on the left-hand sides of conditions (5)- (7)-matched by three equations giving solutions for each of these unknowns in terms of exogenous variables.
The system is self-contained, leaving the money demand function redundant. In particular, equations other than the money demand function feature the inflation-target term, and the money demand function is not needed to obtain expression (5) where inflation is equal in the long run to the exogenous policy target. This passage raises several points that are germane to the present discussion. First, it
shows that the view that money growth determines inflation in the long run is not something likely to be embraced only by those unfamiliar with the properties of modern models; it is held by someone who has worked on New Keynesian models with forces" rather than "money growth" is not really denying money growth center stage for long-run analysis, since Bernanke is explicitly tying the statement to both textbooks and Friedman's work, which both refer to monetary aggregates. Third, the reference to "many textbooks" suggests that the considerations that lead to the position that money growth determines inflation come from model properties that are common to both New Keynesian models and more traditional, textbook models-in particular, from steadystate properties of the models.
It is the third of these points that I pursue in the remainder of this section. In the spirit of Bernanke's reference to "many textbooks," my answer to the Woodford critique relies on propositions about the steady state that are common to both textbook macroeconomics and the New Keynesian model. As intermediate steps, it is worth spelling out an explicit definition of the "long run" (Section 3.2) and considering the properties of the economy consistent with this long run (Section 3.3).
Defining the long run
What is the appropriate definition of the "long run" in monetary policy analysis? Almost tautologically, the "long run" is the steady state of a model 11 or, equivalently, the version of the economy that pertains when unconditional expectations (where they exist) are taken of model variables. But prominent discussions in the literature, discussed below, allow more economic content to be put into the discussion of "long run," while still producing definitions that are consistent with interpreting the "long run" as referring to the steady state or to unconditional means.
Specifically, there is support for the following position: In monetary analysis, the long run is defined as the economic conditions prevailing after prices have fully adjusted to monetary policy actions. For example, Baumol and Blinder (1982, p. 301) , having, as noted above, brought the natural rate hypothesis into their framework, described the "vertical (long-run) Phillips curve" as the position to which the economy reverted as a result of its "self-correcting mechanism," consisting of gradual adjustment of wages and
prices to a monetary policy action. The "long run" accordingly corresponds to the state of the economy prevailing after any inertia in nominal prices and wages has passed. In the context of the preceding Phillips curve (1), the process of price adjustment tends to close the output gap and to line up the path of inflation with the path of the steady-state inflation rate π t *.
The corollary of this conception of "long run" is that price stickiness is a temporary-that is, short-run-phenomenon. That perspective is made explicit in a description of wage and price stickiness given by John Taylor:
One of the central reasons that the economy departs from the natural rate for prolonged periods is the existence of nominal wage and price rigidities that prevent the economy from adjusting quickly to disturbances. But these wage and price rigidities are temporary; they lead to temporary fluctuations in employment… Eventually the economy tends to return to the natural rate of unemployment, and (on average) unemployment is equal to the natural rate. (Taylor, 1987, p. 351.) Taylor's perspective is consistent with other discussions of sticky-price models that are restricted to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis. 12 For example, the classic analysis of Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 347) , states that "[w]e should expect to converge to the neoclassical equilibrium in the long run," but that "in the short run… stickiness of wages and prices… will affect the adjustment process."
As price stickiness is a temporary phenomenon, it should not be assumed to hold when studying steady-state behavior. Analyzing the long run, including the long-run determination of inflation, implies analyzing conditions where prices have adjusted fully to monetary policy actions.
------------------------------------
12 I.e., the restriction that the economy converges to the flexible-price steady state, so that the mean value of output in the sticky-price model coincides with the mean of output of a flexible-price version of the economy. In this discussion, I further assume that the mean values of output and real interest rate in the flexible-price economy (and so the mean values in the sticky-price model too) are invariant to different monetary policy rules and different inflation rates, implying that there is no violation of superneutrality. See McCallum (1990 McCallum ( , 2004 for further discussion of superneutrality.
Economic conditions in the long run
The short-run/long-run distinction has important implications for the ability of the central bank to affect interest rates. The mechanism through which monetary policy actions (open market operations) have their usual effect on interest rates relies on price stickiness, and so wears off in the long run. Abel and Bernanke (1992) answer. My contention is that pointing to the intercept does not deliver a satisfying answer to the question of how a central bank determines inflation in the long run.
To describe the long-run determination of inflation, one must, as discussed above, consider the properties of the economy in steady state. Whereas my focus was on the money growth/inflation connection that can be derived from the steady-state money demand function, Woodford's approach is to treat the short-term nominal interest rate as a choice variable-a policy instrument-in the long run. Alternatively, he could be regarded as treating the steady-state inflation rate as a policy instrument in the long run.
Under either interpretation, Woodford is making a high-level assumption. My less highlevel approach involves considering the behavior of the economy in steady state, the curbs that exist in the steady-state economy on the power of monetary policy to affect real variables, and the central bank's continuing power to affect nominal variables in that steady state. That continuing power does give the central bank the ability to determine inflation and the nominal interest rate in the long run, but not in such a direct manner that either should be treated as a policy instrument.
The argument developed here appeared in skeletal form in Nelson (2007 
implying that the inflation rate and the rate of growth in nominal money have a one-for- The steady-state system therefore consists of equations (5), (6), (7), and (8). How have things changed in the steady state compared to the dynamic case? As discussed in Section 3.1, they have not changed in a mathematical sense. We still have a selfcontained system of three equations in y, R and π plus a fourth equation (the money demand equation) relating these variables (or, in steady state, a subset of them) to money.
But, economically, things have changed. Mechanical application of the analysis of the dynamic model to the steady-state case requires treating the R equation (7) as a policy rule. Equation (7), however, is a steady-state version of the Fisher equation, with the real-rate term exogenous. So treatment of the R equation as a policy rule now requires taking the position that R is a policy instrument in (7) only affect nominal balances, but also real balances in the same direction. An enlargement of real money balances in turn produces an R t fall-the liquidity effect-in order for the money demand equation to be satisfied; conversely, R t rises in the case of a reduction in real balances. The monetary authority is able to affect both real and nominal interest rates via the liquidity effect produced by the change in real balances. In these circumstances, it is legitimate to follow the standard practice of studying dynamic systems which make R t (or R t relative to its steady-state value) the policy instrument, and then (assuming that the interest-rate rule features no reaction to money) the money demand equation assumes its familiar status of a redundant condition. But in the long run, things change: nominal price stickiness dissipates completely; monetary neutrality prevails; prices move by the same percentage as the nominal money stock; the determination of real money balances is separate from that of nominal balances; and the liquidity effect is gone.
Thus the behavior of the economy in steady state is characterized by Milton Friedman's observation, "The central bank cannot determine interest rates except by producing inflation." 15 This observation is reflected in textbook analysis-implicitly in the AbelBernanke (1992) quotations above, and explicitly in other textbook discussions, such as Ritter and Silber's (1983, p. 431) statement that under price flexibility (and so in the steady state of any sticky-price model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis), "A change in the money supply cannot alter the real rate; it can only influence nominal rates by changing inflationary expectations." Accordingly, the task for a monetary policy analyst interested in steady-state inflation determination is to describe how central bank actions determine the long-run expectation of inflation when they cannot affect the real interest rate.
We therefore come to why the steady-state inflation rate is pinned down by steady-state money growth. Though they no longer affect real interest rates, and no longer can affect The interdependent positions that (a) long-run money growth determines long-run inflation, and (b) the monetary authority cannot treat the nominal interest rate as an instrument in the long run, are widely shared. It is common to find in discussions by policymakers and policy advisors statements to the effect that the short-term nominal interest rate is not a variable permanently at their disposal as an instrument, but rather, in keeping with the preceding discussion, a variable that is a policy instrument only in the short run. To this end, a particularly notable statement is that of Goodhart (1992, p. 315 ):
a "central bank's control over short-term interest rates… is relatively short, in terms of weeks, quarters or a few years. In the long term, nominal interest rates will be
determined by real (international) forces and the expected rate of inflation." Another quotation that goes to the heart of the matter is due to then-Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis President Darryl Francis, who said in 1973: "It is wrong to accept at face value the statement [that] the 'Fed can control interest rates' without the corresponding explanation of how the Fed can do this…" (Francis, 1973, pp. 8−9 .) Francis might have added that such an explanation is especially needed for the study of long-run interest-rate and inflation determination.
This does not preclude using frameworks like Woodford's that refer to the inflation target in the interest-rate rule as the determinant of steady-state inflation; rather, what needs to be kept in mind is that such an approach is a shortcut or abstraction that takes for granted the underlying operations involving money on the part of the central bank that secure long-run control of the interest rate and inflation.
Even if one is satisfied with viewing the inflation-target portion of the interest-rate rule as
what determines the steady-state inflation rate, and wishes to implement this approach empirically, one must face the fact that the inflation target is often not measured directly. 
Clarifications and objections
It is useful to clarify the argument outlined above by highlighting some distinctions from other discussions of interest-rate rules in the literature. In this section, I emphasize that my argument does not have anything to do with appealing to the danger of multiple model equilibria (Section 4.1). It is also important to consider the changing status of the IS equation when one is studying the long run (Section 4.2). Finally, Section 4.3 points out some discontinuities between sticky-price models and flexible-price models such as the one studied by Woodford (2003, Chapter 2) .
Feasibility is the problem, not indeterminacy
My opposition to representing steady-state monetary policy as an interest-rate setting decision does not rest on any appeal to the possibility of multiple equilibria. 16 In fact, there is no danger of multiple model solutions in the steady state studied above. From inspection of equation (9), it is clear that no uniqueness problems exist: given the steady- The argument outlined in Section 3.4 above therefore differs from critiques of interestrate rules or of interest-rate pegging because mine is not a claim about the undesirable consequences of certain interest-rate policies. Instead, it is a neutrality claim that denies the feasibility of affecting interest rates in the long run, other than through the Fisher effect. This neutrality result rules out viewing interest rates as a long-run policy instrument. Money growth, on the other hand, is a variable that the central bank can view as an instrument in the long run, and its long-run influence on inflation and interest rates comes from having this instrument at its disposal. Consequently, specifying monetary policy in terms of an interest-rate rule when prices are flexible amounts to a high-level assumption (or shortcut) in a way that the same specification in a sticky-price model is not. 
Interest rates and aggregate demand
where, as in Woodford (2003, p. 395) , "t.i.p." denotes "terms independent of policy." In a sticky-price model such as that in Woodford (2007) , however, such a representation of the Fisher equation is not admissible: rather
because the dynamics of the real interest rate are not independent of monetary policy. In the sticky-price model, then, R t is susceptible to central bank influence for given E t π t+1 ; whereas in the flexible-price model the only way the central bank can control R t is by control of E t π t+1 . Woodford's (2003, Chapter 2) model therefore has the property of flexible-price models described in the Ritter-Silber (1983) observation given above, a property shared, as noted, with the steady state of any sticky-price model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis.
The dichotomy between sticky-price and flexible-price models is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 describes the period-t reaction of interest rates and money to an expansionary open-market purchase in a typical sticky-price model (including standard New Keynesian models). The signs of responses depicted in this figure would be those typically associated with a positive exogenous shock to a univariate money growth rule.
------------------------------------
Underlying the figure are standard assumptions that (a) the expansion is expected to be followed by another expansionary action in the following period (and so makes period-t expectations of period-t+1 nominal money growth higher than they would be in the absence of the expansionary action), 20 and ( The contrast between Figures 1 and 2 is underscored by considering standard descriptions of the transmission mechanism. Ramey (1993, p. 2) describes the standard view of the transmission mechanism as one where central bank injections of nominal base money also initially raise the quantity real base money; the increase in the latter induces a decline in the nominal interest rate; and the decline in the nominal rate contributes to a decline in the real rate. As Ramey notes, this view of the transmission mechanism rests on the existence of price stickiness. All of her description carries through to the adjustment process in Woodford's (2007) model, which has nominal rigidity. None of it ------------------------------------20 This assumption would be appropriate, for example, if the monetary policy rule was a stationary AR(1) money growth rule with positive AR parameter. 21 The figure depicts the behavior within a single period of several simultaneously determined endogenous variables. The arrows employed in the figure serve, as in (e.g.) Dornbusch and Fisher (1978, p. 362) , to lay out how monetary policy transmission works in the model; they do not depict a timing sequence. Note also that while higher money growth tends, as indicated, to raise expected inflation in both sticky-price and flexible-price models, in the former case this typically occurs via an output-gap channel (see e.g. Svensson, 2001, p. 15) . Therefore, unless one is satisfied with the high-level assumption that the central bank can treat E t π t+1 as a policy instrument, one must see the interest-rate rule in a flexible-price model as derived from the influence on E t π t+1 of the only variable that is a bona fide policy instrument in the long run: money growth. The fact that Woodford (2003) looks at both sticky-price and flexible-price models thus does not mean that all interest-rate results carry across both models. In particular, the underlying mechanism for central 26 bank influence on interest rates is distinct in flexible-price models, with these models implying exclusive reliance on the Fisher effect for interest-rate control.
Conclusion
To summarize, Woodford's (2007) analysis is algebraically correct but rests on high-level assumptions about the central bank's long-run control of the interest rate. By contrast, the proposition that inflation, in the long run, is determined by money growth, goes beneath those high-level assumptions and provides an underpinning for the conviction that the central bank can deliver the long-run inflation rate at its target value (and so deliver the corresponding implied nominal interest rate).
